Joseph Kabila's return: What it means for the DRC's political landscape

Dr Sizo Nkala

The former president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Joseph Kabila returned to the country last week after spending two years in self-imposed exile in South Africa.

Kabila ruled the vast central African country from 2001 after taking over from his father, Laurent Kabila, until 2019 when he handed over the reins to the incumbent President Felix Tshisekedi. Kabila’s relationship with President Tshisekedi has deteriorated further since the collapse of their coalition government in 2020.

Tshisekedi’s government has repeatedly accused Kabila of collaborating with the M23 rebels to overthrow the government and charged him with committing treason, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Kabila has denied these accusations. A few days before Kabila arrived in the DRC, the country’s Senate which is controlled by the ruling Sacred Union coalition voted to repeal Kabila’s honorary title as a lifelong Senator and lifted his immunity from prosecution on the 23rd of May.

The former president responded in a video posted on social media denouncing Tshisekedi’s government as a dictatorship and decrying the decline of democracy in the country. He arrived in DRC’s eastern city of Goma on May 26. Goma, the strategic capital city of North Kivu province, has been under the control of the M23 since they captured it in January.

As such, he will be safe from any arrest as the government in Kinshasa has effectively lost any jurisdiction in the territory. The M23 welcomed Kabila’s arrival stating that it wished him a pleasant stay in the city. Since he arrived in Goma, Kabila has tried to portray himself as a peacemaker.

He met with religious leaders from North Kivu to discuss the current situation in the DRC in what could be the beginning of a bid to drum up public support and stir an anti-government sentiment. To reduce Kabila’s influence in the country, the DRC government has imposed a media blackout on the former president by banning all media outlets including television, radio, print and digital press from covering anything about Kabila and his political party, the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD).

This could be an admission on the part of the government of Kabila’s potential to influence public opinion.Kabila arrives on the scene as the M23 and the DRC government have begun negotiations on the resolution of the conflict. President Tshisekedi and his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame, whose government is believed to be backing the M23 rebels met in person in Qatar in March where they committed to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.

This meeting paved the way for the DRC government and the M23 rebels to begin direct negotiations for the first time since the beginning of the conflict in 2021. Eventually, the two sides agreed to stop the fighting to allow the Qatar talks to proceed.

The Rwandan and DRC foreign ministers later met in Washington, US, in April where they signed an agreement pledging mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and a commitment to desist from availing military aid to non-state actors. 

The two parties also promised to produce a draft peace deal at the beginning of May. According to President Donald Trump’s Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulous, the draft peace plan was duly submitted early in May. Negotiations are underway to produce a final draft.

However, the talks between the DRC government and the M23 have since stalled as fighting is continuing unabated despite the earlier commitments to an unconditional ceasefire. On June 4 pro-government forces clashed with M23 forces in South Kivu. The latter also announced that it would attack a government military base located between Masisi and Walikale districts.

The continued fighting could be an indication that both parties are not willing to make major concessions in the negotiations and may be trying to bolster their negotiating positions through military gains.The presence of Kabila in Goma adds a new dynamic to the conflict.

The fact that Corneille Nangaa, a former close ally of Kabila who served as his election chief, is the leader of the M23 rebels does indeed draw a direct link between the former president and the rebel group thus lending credence to the government’s claims. Kabila and the M23 share a common goal of overthrowing the Tshisekedi regime.

While the M23 has the forces and the military muscle, its influence seems to be localized. It is also struggling to shake off the image of being the proxy of a foreign power thus limiting its political appeal to the broad section of the DRC population.

Having led the country for 18 years, Kabila still commands a significant following among the Congolese people and the political class. Just a few years ago he headed the Common Front for Congo (FCC) coalition that won almost 70 per cent of the seats in the Congolese parliament in the 2018 elections and managed to secure key posts in Tshisekedi’s government until their fallout in 2020.

Kabila also retains extensive links with the DRC military that he can potentially use to turn the army against the government. There have already been defections from the government forces to the M23 in the last few months which demonstrated that the Tshisekedi regime does not enjoy universal support within the military ranks.

The acceleration of this trend cannot be ruled out. Moreover, Kabila’s name recognition especially outside of the DRC far surpasses that of any of the rebel leaders. Thus, having him sing from the same hymn book as them will give the rebel group desperately needed international legitimacy.

The influential former South African president Thabo Mbeki emerged from his meeting with Kabila back in March reiterating most of the M23 talking points. Hence, Kabila’s return has the potential to significantly shift the dynamics of the conflict which explains the government’s panic reaction.

* Dr. Sizo Nkala is a Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg’s Centre for Africa-China Studies.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.